The strategic partnership between China and Pakistan has long been described by officials in both countries as an “all-weather friendship.” For decades, the relationship has rested on military cooperation, economic investment, and shared geopolitical interests. Yet recent developments suggest that this partnership has evolved beyond a traditional alliance. According to growing international research, it now increasingly functions as a mutually reinforcing security architecture in which Beijing’s model of authoritarian governance and Islamabad’s domestic coercive apparatus have become deeply intertwined.
At the heart of this transformation lies the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), a flagship project of China’s Belt and Road Initiative worth approximately USD 65 billion. While promoted as an ambitious infrastructure and economic development programme, CPEC has simultaneously expanded security cooperation between the two countries, linking China’s strategic investments with Pakistan’s internal security priorities. The result, analysts argue, has been a convergence that extends from counterterrorism operations to surveillance technologies, censorship, the treatment of ethnic minorities, and even the repression of critics beyond national borders.
China’s Global Campaign of Transnational Repression
The broader international context illustrates why this partnership deserves closer attention.
Recent international reports have documented 854 confirmed incidents of transnational repression worldwide between 2014 and 2022. Of these, 253 were attributed to the People’s Republic of China, making Beijing the world’s leading practitioner of cross-border repression.
These figures include physical intimidation, arbitrary detention, deportations, kidnapping attempts and other coercive measures directed against dissidents, activists and minority communities living abroad. Researchers stress that the true scale is likely much larger, since available statistics exclude digital harassment, intimidation of relatives inside China and unsuccessful attempts to coerce overseas critics.
This international campaign has increasingly intersected with Pakistan’s own security policies.
CPEC Changed More Than the Economy
When President Xi Jinping visited Islamabad in 2015 to launch CPEC formally, the agreement was celebrated as an economic milestone that would transform Pakistan’s infrastructure through highways, ports, railways and energy projects.
However, the initiative also fundamentally reshaped bilateral security cooperation.
As billions of dollars in Chinese investments flowed into Pakistan, particularly into sensitive regions such as Balochistan, protecting these assets became a shared strategic priority. Security concerns surrounding Chinese personnel, infrastructure projects and supply routes gradually expanded the operational cooperation between Chinese and Pakistani security institutions.
Official joint statements repeatedly emphasised “zero tolerance for terrorism,” respect for sovereignty and opposition to what both governments describe as the “politicisation” of counterterrorism.
Critics argue that these formulations have increasingly served as political justification for suppressing dissent.
For Beijing, they provide diplomatic cover for its policies in Xinjiang.
For Islamabad, similar language has been used to justify military operations, enforced disappearances and restrictions targeting political activists, journalists and civil society organisations.
The Uyghur Question
Perhaps the clearest example of this convergence concerns Pakistan’s treatment of Uyghur Muslims.
Cooperation between Islamabad and Beijing on Uyghur issues dates back to the late 1990s.
One of the earliest documented cases occurred in 1997, when Pakistan deported fourteen Uyghur students following Chinese allegations linking them to separatist activities after unrest in Xinjiang.
Over the following decades, what began as isolated deportations evolved into systematic security cooperation.
Research conducted by the Uyghur Human Rights Project and the Oxus Society identified at least twenty-one confirmed cases involving detention or deportation of Uyghurs through Pakistan and Afghanistan, while researchers estimate the real number may approach ninety undocumented incidents.
Those returned to China frequently disappeared into detention facilities associated with torture, prolonged imprisonment, forced political indoctrination and family separation.
After President Xi Jinping called in 2014 for authorities to cast “nets from the Earth to the sky,” China’s overseas surveillance of Uyghur communities intensified.
Pakistan increasingly became part of that broader monitoring system.
Reports indicate that Chinese officials pressured foreign governments through diplomatic channels, including efforts affecting Uyghurs residing in Pakistan. Individuals reportedly received warnings that refusing to return to China could lead to retaliation against family members.
As recently as November 2023, Pakistani authorities reportedly raided homes belonging to Uyghur families in Rawalpindi shortly before implementing migrant expulsion measures that affected nearly one hundred Uyghurs.
Balochistan and the Security Narrative
The same security logic has increasingly been applied to Pakistan’s internal political landscape.
Chinese investments in Balochistan have elevated local grievances into matters of strategic concern for both governments.
Opposition to CPEC projects, land acquisition, environmental concerns and resource extraction is increasingly treated through a counterterrorism framework rather than as political dissent.
International human rights organisations documented dozens of arrests, enforced disappearances and arbitrary detentions involving Baloch activists between January 2024 and March 2025.
Many of those targeted had engaged in peaceful advocacy concerning missing persons, alleged extrajudicial killings and demands for greater provincial autonomy.
One particularly significant incident occurred in July 2024, when Pakistan’s Frontier Corps opened fire on buses carrying participants travelling to the Baloch National Gathering in Gwadar.
According to international reporting, at least fourteen civilians associated with the non-violent Baloch Yakjehti Committee were injured.
Pressure on Pashtun Activists
The Pashtun Tahafuz Movement (PTM), another peaceful movement advocating civil rights and accountability for military operations, has also faced growing pressure.
Freedom House documented arrests targeting PTM rallies throughout 2023.
Prominent PTM leader Ali Wazir was charged with sedition despite simultaneously serving as a member of Pakistan’s parliament.
Lawyers, journalists and activists who criticised enforced disappearances allegedly carried out by security forces similarly found themselves facing criminal investigations and sedition charges.
The cumulative effect has been the shrinking of civic space, particularly where criticism intersects with issues considered sensitive by either Islamabad or Beijing.
Digital Surveillance Expands State Control
Perhaps the most visible area of Chinese influence concerns Pakistan’s digital governance.
The Prevention of Electronic Crimes Act (PECA), originally introduced to combat cybercrime and online harassment, has gradually evolved into one of the country’s most controversial legal instruments.
Amendments adopted in January 2025 significantly broadened its scope.
Authorities gained wider powers to prosecute vaguely defined online content considered “false,” contrary to “the ideology of Pakistan,” or capable of generating “fear or panic.”
The revised legislation also created a government-controlled regulatory authority while introducing prison sentences of up to three years.
Since early 2025, multiple journalists have reportedly been prosecuted under PECA, while authorities blocked several YouTube channels critical of state institutions.
Digital rights advocates argue that the legislation forms part of a broader effort to centralise control over online information.
Technology has reinforced this trend.
Huawei’s Safe City projects in Islamabad, Lahore and Peshawar have introduced extensive surveillance systems linked to central command centres.
These integrated networks resemble surveillance infrastructures previously deployed in Xinjiang, raising concerns among human rights organisations that they may increasingly be used to monitor political activity rather than solely criminal threats.
Repression Beyond Pakistan’s Borders
The partnership has also acquired an increasingly transnational character.
Pakistani courts have recently convicted several journalists and commentators living abroad in absentia, with some receiving life sentences over allegations connected to protests following the arrest of former Prime Minister Imran Khan.
These prosecutions carry an important symbolic message: physical distance no longer guarantees protection from state coercion.
Analysts note similarities with China’s own methods of pressuring overseas critics by targeting family members, restricting travel, initiating legal proceedings or launching reputational campaigns.
Pakistan increasingly appears to employ comparable tools, including sedition charges, Exit Control Lists and pressure directed at relatives remaining inside the country.
Strategic Partnership or Shared Repression?
It would be inaccurate to suggest that Pakistan’s coercive institutions emerged because of Chinese influence.
Military dominance, censorship, enforced disappearances and security-driven governance have long characterised elements of Pakistan’s political system.
However, Beijing has strengthened these existing structures by providing advanced surveillance technologies, diplomatic protection, economic leverage and an internationally legitimising narrative centred on counterterrorism and state sovereignty.
This convergence has significantly enhanced institutional capacity while simultaneously narrowing opportunities for accountability, transparency and democratic oversight.
Limited International Response
Despite mounting evidence, the international response has remained cautious.
Hearings conducted by the Tom Lantos Human Rights Commission during 2025 and 2026 identified both China and Pakistan as countries of concern regarding transnational repression.
Nevertheless, geopolitical considerations, strategic competition, trade interests and counterterrorism cooperation continue to dilute meaningful international pressure.
For governments, balancing security partnerships with human rights concerns remains politically difficult.
For dissidents, journalists, minority communities and civil society activists, however, the consequences are immediate.
The China-Pakistan relationship has evolved beyond diplomatic rhetoric and economic cooperation.
Increasingly, it represents an integrated security model in which surveillance, legal coercion, digital control and political repression reinforce one another across borders.
For those living under its reach, the phrase “all-weather friendship” no longer signifies strategic partnership alone. It has become synonymous with an expanding system of coercive governance that extends far beyond the frontiers of either country.