The relationship between China and Pakistan is often presented as a stable strategic alliance built on economic cooperation, defense, and a shared understanding of security. In reality, however, this relationship has taken on much darker dimensions in recent years. Pakistan’s growing dependence on China, combined with Beijing’s technological, economic, and military influence, has created an environment where Chinese security priorities intersect with Islamabad’s domestic mechanisms of repression.
International reports have documented hundreds of incidents of transnational repression between 2014 and 2022, with China emerging as the most active state actor in this field. These numbers, however, do not fully capture the extent of the phenomenon, as they exclude digital threats, the intimidation of relatives, pressure exerted on families, or failed attempts at coercion.
At the same time, Pakistan has integrated itself ever deeper into China’s sphere of influence through the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor, known as CPEC—a multi-billion-dollar program. Concurrently, the bulk of Pakistani arms imports now originates from China. This dual dependence, both economic and military, has transformed bilateral cooperation into something far broader than a simple alliance.
The Case of the Uyghurs and Balochistan
The repression of Uyghurs who are located in or have passed through Pakistani territory serves as a characteristic example. As early as the 1990s, Pakistan cooperated with China in arresting and deporting Uyghur Muslims whom Beijing accused of separatist activities. Over time, incidents that initially appeared to be isolated cases evolved into a permanent mechanism of security cooperation.
Individuals returned to China often disappear into a detention system that has been linked to torture, long-term imprisonment, and family separation. Meanwhile, there are reports of pressure being exerted on Uyghurs living in Pakistan—even through threats against their relatives in China—in order to force them to return or cease all public activity.
This same logic of securitization extends to Balochistan. The region has acquired particular importance due to Chinese investments and CPEC projects. However, local reactions regarding land expropriation, the exploitation of natural resources, and the exclusion of local communities are increasingly treated as security threats rather than political or social issues.
Baloch activists, civil organizations, and movements demanding transparency, rights, and accountability face arrests, disappearances, and violent crackdowns. The situation is similar for the Pashtun Tahafuz Movement, which has faced persecution, arrests, and charges of sedition or undermining the state. In other words, domestic voices of protest are framed as threats to stability, especially when they touch upon issues related to Chinese interests.
Digital Repression and Mass Surveillance
Digital repression constitutes yet another critical arena. Pakistan’s electronic crimes legislation, initially presented as a tool to combat online harassment and hate speech, has evolved into a mechanism for controlling public discourse. Recent amendments significantly expanded its scope, criminalizing vague concepts such as “false content” or material deemed contrary to the “ideology of Pakistan.”
Journalists, commentators, and critics of the state have faced prosecution, while YouTube channels and other platforms have been blocked. The technological dimension is equally significant. Chinese surveillance systems, such as Huawei’s Safe City programs, have been installed in major Pakistani cities, creating a mass surveillance infrastructure. The similarity of these mechanisms to technologies used in Xinjiang raises justifiable concerns.
Targeting the Diaspora
Repression is no longer confined within borders. Pakistan is beginning to utilize legal and administrative tools against critics living abroad. Convictions in absentia, exit control lists, pressure on relatives, and sedition charges serve as messages to the diaspora: even outside of Pakistan, criticism can have consequences.
This strongly echoes the methods China has used against dissidents abroad. Beijing frequently targets the families of activists living in China to pressure those residing in the West. Pakistan appears to be adopting similar practices, gradually incorporating elements of the Chinese model of transnational repression.
A Dangerous Convergence
Therefore, China–Pakistan cooperation should not be viewed merely as an ordinary strategic alliance. Pakistan already possessed its own mechanisms of repression, censorship, and coercion. China, however, offers additional capabilities: surveillance technologies, diplomatic cover, economic leverage, and an ideological vocabulary that labels repression as “counter-terrorism,” “sovereignty,” and “non-interference.”
The Conclusion: The result is a dangerous convergence. Economic dependence turns into political alignment. Security becomes a pretext for silencing. Infrastructure cooperation ends up reinforcing control mechanisms. And for Uyghurs, Balochs, Pashtuns, journalists, activists, and exiled critics, the famous “all-weather friendship” between China and Pakistan is no longer just a diplomatic slogan. It is a resilient system of mutual repression.